Institutions and their historical dynamics are indispensable to understanding how the contemporary urban politics of developing world democracies differs from the present day urban politics of the developed world. The paper sketches the outline of a comparative historical account of how the local government institutions that have become familiar among the cities of developed democracies have emerged. Then, it shows how examination of institutional arrangements in the cities of contemporary developing democracies from the same broadly comparative perspective illuminates important differences between urban politics there from contemporary processes in the cities of developed countries.
Introduction
In the summer of 2013, hundreds of thousands of protesters in the cities of disparate regions in the developing world took to the streets. Across Brazil, urban citizens demonstrated for lower transit fares and better schools; in Turkey, the demolition of an urban park for a commercial development in Istanbul galvanized a national wave of protest; in South Africa, waves of service delivery protests over access to water, electricity and housing had been building for years. Although the protesters in each country often had their eye partly on national and even international politics, they each directed their protests at immediate official actions of urban municipal governments. Alexis de Tocqueville would have recognized the parallels between these protests and the local civic engagement he observed in the largely rural United States of the early nineteenth century. At the time he wrote, states throughout Europe and North America had begun to construct local government institutions to extend state power to the local level. In his study of the United States, Tocqueville crystallized a view that local institutions also offered the means to incorporate elements of local citizen participation into the activities of the state. Today, in the developing world as well as in settled democracies, local government is the most pervasive form of decentralization and a near-universal feature of territorial states.
Despite calls to bring institutions into the study of urban governance (Gross, 2016; Pierre, 2011) , institutional analysis has continued to play a surprisingly marginal role in the recent comparative study of urban politics. Contemporary accounts of governance in cities and communities frequently relegate the context of local government and the organization of civil society to the background of analytical frameworks. Calls for "relational" accounts of cities (Ward, 2010) show little recognition of how institutional context might shape local agency. Even analyses of "state rescaling" often rely on shifting functional requirements of the capitalist economy rather than endogenous dynamics of the state itself to account for institutional change (Brenner, 2004) . The imprint of Napoleonic institutions across Europe, or common law institutions of local governance in North America, remain indispensable to understanding the significant variations that continue to characterize the operation of local linkages in developed democracies.
Institutions and their historical dynamics are indispensable to understanding how the contemporary urban politics of developing world democracies differs from the present day urban politics of the developed world. The paper sketches the outline of a comparative historical account of how the local government institutions that have become familiar among the cities of developed democracies have emerged. Then, it shows how examination of institutional arrangements in the cities of contemporary developing democracies from the same broadly comparative perspective illuminates important differences between urban politics there from contemporary processes in the cities of developed countries.
What is an Institutional Infrastructure of Local Governance
This account focuses on an interrelated set of institutions that are central to the local state, to its links with local society, and to the linkages within both state and society to the elements of state and society at supralocal scales. Established scholarship in comparative politics demonstrates that these configurations of institutions share common features, and also vary in systematically different ways. Following Mann (1984) , these institutions can be considered as part of the infrastructure of institutions that carry out the will of state elites in society. Alternatively, as work on local governance itself has emphasized, they can furnish means for empowerment to elites or citizens within cities and communities (Ostrom, 1990; Pierre, 1999) . What we will call infrastructures of local governance encompass only that part of the overall state infrastructure that is relevant to state-society relations within cities and communities. Since local democracy in contemporary nation-states comprises part of a larger system of multilevel institutions, it generally assumes multilevel forms. Mechanisms for democratic accountability at the local and wider scales, and the political and civic organizations that form around them, are components of these institutional infrastructures.
At the local level itself, these institutions include the formal institutions of local government, along with local administration of the supralocal state and other informal or para-public organizations that participate in governance at the local level. Although aspects of local government like a mayoral decision can be purely local, the rules of the game for local government often are not. Electoral laws and systems of local public administration, for instance, are anchored in national legislative or constitutional provisions and supported by other resources at wider scales.
An infrastructure of local governance, moreover, extends beyond local government alone. The powers and resources for local government nest in a wider institutional of relations between the local and higher levels. Wider national systems define the policy functions that local governments exercise, the institutional, fiscal and political capacities they possess, the constraints they face, and the ways they are supervised or regulated. Relations with higher level governments include not only administrative, fiscal and legal parameters, but also the patterns of informal and formal political interchange between levels in policy and implementation that have often been characterized as "central-local relations" (Ansell & Di Palma, 2004; Tarrow, 1977) .
Organization in civil society comprises a further element of this infrastructure. Political party systems vary widely in their patterns of organization, in ways that are closely linked to electoral laws and other national systems of institutions. The organization of business, labour and economic interests also differs systematically among countries. Work on civic engagement and social capital has highlighted national differences in a further sector of civil society that often mobilizes at the local level to influence policy (Putnam, 2002) . As accounts of social movements and urban governance have both shown extensively, organization within society can also systematically influence national patterns of local governance.
Civil society spans a variegated arena of social association and organization that is partly distinct from both the polity and the economy. Local professional and community groups, neighbourhood associations, professional communities, religious organizations all belong to this domain. Perhaps even more than the others, civil society is embedded in the organization of local communities. As Skocpol has argued, however, it is just as capable of being organized primarily beyond the local level in order to play a role at the scale of the nation state (Skocpol, 2003) . Even if some associations are purely local in character, organizations like political parties, professional associations and even many environmental activist groups are also national or even transnational in scope.
Although composed of numerous distinct institutions with their own history and functions, the institutional infrastructure of a society remains linked in significant ways, these particular institutions are related to each other as part of what Greif (2006, p. 205 ) calls an institutional complex.
Institutions that are part of a complex "complement one another, reflect the influences of the same coordinating factors, or share the same institutional influences". Complementarities among institutions can take shape in numerous ways: from around top-down logics of policy implementation, around bottom up logics of local, or around common state-society relationships such as patron-client relations. Coordination typically takes place around broadly similar sets of linkages between the state and society at both the local and the supralocal level, and between local and supralocal institutions within the state and civil society (Figure 1 ). Through embedding in constitutional orders, legal systems or local government legislation, common institutions often exercise pervasive influence on these infrastructures. At the same time, they are embedded in the everyday practices of governance within communities and cities, and cultural beliefs and expectations about those practices. In the layered state that characterizes most contemporary societies, the possibilities that layered governance offers for relations between the local and supralocal levels correspond to several broadly defined types (Table  1 ). In the lower left corner, a full-fledged Elitist system of local governance would be carried out essentially from above. Higher-level officials would dictate local actions, and political and civic incorporation at the local level would be limited or even absent. Such arrangements are more characteristic of authoritarian regimes than of contemporary democracies. The emergence of local government institutions even in new democracies reflects a widespread understanding that local governance is critical to infrastructural power, on the one hand, and to local empowerment on the other. The development and global diffusion of the policy state, a form of state built around pursuit of variety of economic, social, and environmental objectives, has reinforced the critical place of local linkages for both of these purposes. Even in contemporary authoritarian regimes, such as the People's Republic of China, the local state can play a critical role. Among democratic systems with elements of democratic local government, the table points to several broad types of divergence in patterns of local state-society relations. In a Local Elitist setting, local officials maintain important influence but local political and civic incorporation remains limited. In a Civic Localist setting, local civic and political incorporation is high, but the vertical integration of the local state with higher levels of the polity remains limited. In a Nationalized setting, local political and social groups are also incorporated into the local state, but here the local state and local politics are integrated within those at higher levels.
These three correspond to distinctive varieties of local governance arrangements. 1 Each favours a different set of mechanisms for assertion of infrastructural power from above, and for empowerment of communities from below. Each institutionalizes different interests in perpetuating existing arrangements among local government officials and in national local relations, and different organizational forms for parties, economic organization, and civic associations. Each results from a distinctive historical trajectory.
The Local Elitist Infrastructure. The first characteristic form of local governance infrastructure captures the established practices of most developed democracies. In this system, participation of any kind of organized political or social interests at the local level remains limited. Rather than national parties, nationally organized interests or other types of civic association, the elites in local government and administration dominate local politics and policy. At the local level, limited opportunities for local electoral challenges, majoritarian local electoral systems, and local geopolitical fragmentation reinforce the position of these local elites and their networks in relation to citizens as well as wider organizational influences. Except among clientelist networks, or for local elites who manage to build legitimacy through machine politics or through brand appeals to local electorates, trust among citizens and between them and the local state remains low.
Where this infrastructure is present, local state-society relations and local-supralocal relations operate according to the terms put by Mann and generations of literature on the state. The example of French local governance, even in the wake of decentralization in the 1980s, demonstrates how this infrastructure operates (Pinson, 2009; Savitch et al., 2002; Sellers, 2002) . State hierarchies themselves offer the main means available to national policymaking elites to bring about local results. Hierarchical authorities to carry out or supervise local policy provide important mechanisms of this sort. So do dynamics of bargaining and reciprocity between local and national elites, and vertical networks of relationships between levels. Low trust in local government among governments at higher lev-els reinforces the reliance on higher level governments to carry out policy. Within local society, civic participation and incorporation remain limited (Sellers, 2002) . Lower levels of societal organization can limit effective opposition to policy initiatives, but also constrain mobilization of support for them. Effective action by the local state depends on resources from higher levels of government, on networks of informal or clientelistic relationships between local government and local elites, and on the success of local government elites in establishing political legitimacy within communities.
Nationalized infrastructure. An alternative to the Local Elitist infrastructure integrates both local governance and politics and the local incorporation of citizens into processes of politics and policymaking on a national scale. Local governments are charged with carrying out policies formulated at the national level. Even where policies are local rather than national, different local governments carry out the same policies at lower levels throughout the country. Beyond governmental arrangements themselves, this infrastructure also relies on a system of highly organized national parties and interests. At the national level, these parties and organizations represent those interests within localities. At the local level, these national organizations incorporate large proportions of the citizenry, and represent their interests within local decision-making processes. National organizations also aggregate local interests, translate them into advocacy for programmatic policies, and transmit these to the national levels as well as further adherence to them in local decision-making. In turn, because of the pervasive presence of these national organizations at the local level, national policymakers linked to them would entrust local decision-makers with greater independent authority to carry out national objectives locally.
The Nationalized Infrastructure most closely follows traditional Weberian presumptions about the relations between national and local policymaking and politics. This system tends to link local public goods provision to national programmes, and to apply policies in a similar way in localities throughout the country. The organization of civil society is also a national matter rather than simply a local one. At the local level, representatives of national parties and organized interests as well as governmental representatives from higher levels cooperate to apply these programmes. These same organizations serve to represent the interests of localities in the national policymaking process. The dual national and local functions of both national parties, organized interests, and local governments themselves favour integration of local and national policy.
The Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands correspond most closely to this type of local-national relations. Local governance in the Swedish case furnishes a well-documented example. Local governments there are among the most empowered in the developed world, and have primary responsibility for administering the welfare state as well as functions like urban planning (Sellers & Lidström, 2007) . Civil society is highly participatory and extensively organized (Rothstein & Stolle, 2003) . Organized business, unions, parties, and civic organizations have typically been ascribed an important role in local governance (Pierre, 1992; Sellers & Kwak, 2011) .
The Civic Localist Infrastructure. Contrast the Nationalized infrastructure with one built instead extensive, incorporated participation at the local level, but with minimal integration into state organization and interest intermediation at higher levels. Local government receives significant responsibilities, but only limited powers and capacities from higher level governments, and depends more on local society to generate political and policy resources. Civic associations within communities rather than nationally organized parties and interests set agendas for local governance. In contrast with the balanced national representation and consensual local governance that the nationalized infrastructure fosters, the Civic Localist infrastructure fosters local responsiveness to the most mobilized, most powerful groups. In such an infrastructure, local autonomy also enables local governance to work at odds with policy at higher levels.
In this infrastructure, policy undertaken at the local level depends on the initiatives of individual local governments. The rules of the local political game encourage responsiveness to local civil society. At the national level, neither local governments themselves, nor local civic associations nor national parties and organized interests provide consistently reliable representation of the interests within localities. Instead, how local issues are treated at higher levels remains the product of shifting coalitions among a range of potential interests. Between the national and the local level, this infrastructure provides no consistent linkages. Intergovernmental trust that might lay the groundwork for national officials to delegate powers to local ones remains limited.
The infrastructure for local governance in the urban areas of the United States exemplifies the characteristic conditions of this type. Transatlantic comparative case studies have demonstrated how the local state in U.S. cities operates in a manner more autonomous from central state hierarchies, and more dependent on business and other civic organization than in Europe (Savitch, et al., 2002; Sellers, 2002) . In one such study, focused on three U.S. cities, Sellers found local governance to be dominated by open-structured, shifting patterns of civic mobilization and coalition-building, and reliant on political and fiscal resources within local communities. Survey-based comparisons of power and influence in U.S. local governance have confirmed these tendencies (Sellers, 2007) .
Origins and Development of Institutional
Infrastructures for Local Governance in the Developed World
In the developed world, the origins of these variations in local governance infrastructures trace back centuries, to early divergences in the formation of states.
2 Understanding how the development of local infrastructures relates to wider processes of state formation also requires a more precise specification of the multiple institutional layers that make up national states. Beyond the legal and governmental institutions that comprised among the earliest elements of early European states, and the development of the administrative state over the course of the nineteenth century in many countries, a more recent kind of institutions emerged from the late 19 th century in Europe and North America to decisively shape this infrastructure.
In order to understand the development of national local governance infrastructures, it is critical to distinguish the policy state from these other elements. This term refers to a set of institutions that direct state infrastructures toward pursuit of variety of economic, social, and environmental objectives in society. States have always carried out policy. The policy state represents the institutionalization of this element into institutionalized programmes and structures for their implementation. The myriad functions of the welfare state constitute one of the most extensive components of the policy state. At the local level, urban planning and policies to provide physical infrastructure for cities and communities have also emerged as distinct institutionalized domains of state activity. The mobilization of local and national states around agendas to promote economic development has drawn on these policies, and elaborated others. Environmental and security agendas have given rise to further institutionalized policy agendas.
The policy state is mainly a product of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In those countries that experienced industrialization before the early twentieth century, most of the institutional attributes of national states had already been well established before the policy state emerged. The territorial scope of state authority, the constitutional order of governmental institutions, and in most countries the foundations of the administrative state and the territorial order of subnational governments had already been laid. The foundations of distinct local states, and dominant elements of the Local Elitist and the Civic Localist infrastructures of local governance, were also established prior this earlier era. In Civic Localist settings, the policy state generally developed under conditions of national democratic rule. In the Local Elitist countries of Continental Europe and most of the countries that developed Nationalized infrastructures, the beginnings of the policy state emerged prior to full democratization. With limited exceptions, however, the twentieth century democratic regimes elaborated welfare states and other sectors of policy in ways that built upon and reinforced the distinctive institutional infrastructures that had already been in place.
The contemporary infrastructures of local governance in developed democracies trace lineages back to medieval and early modern institutions. Even under the Absolutism that dominated most of the European continent through the eighteenth century, and the corresponding Japanese regime of the Tokugawa Shogunate, recent studies of local state-society relations have found institutions for governance at the local level, and an important role for local elites in emerging state forms. Rather than replace local institutions altogether, Absolutism transformed them. Reduced powers for local assemblies, a growth in the importance of vertical ties among elites, and limited powers for the peasantry set the territories that would develop Local Elitist infrastructures on a pathway toward this model.
Over the same medieval and early modern eras, parallel studies have found precursors to the Civic Localist and Nationalized infrastructures characterized large portions of the territories where these institutional complexes would later dominate. A variety of institutions preserved local assemblies or other opportunities to participate in governance, and embedded these in supralocal representation within territorial states. Support from freeholders or landowning peasants, and in the early modern era from Protestant religious movements, helped sustain these local institutions.
Throughout what are now the older, developed democracies, the long nineteenth century between the French Revolution and World War I was the era when national local government institutions and infrastructures for incorporation of civil society at the local level were first established. This common development was linked to a whole range of others more familiar to comparative historical analysis: the institutional consolidation of national states, the spread of market capitalism and urbanization, the development of administrative states, the rise of civic associations, working class movements and political parties, and the struggle over national democratization. Differences in the course of local institution-building, and the infrastructures of institutions that emerged from these, laid the foundations for the divergent patterns of linkages we have outlined in the models.
In the countries that developed Local Elitist infrastructures, local government institutions were subordinated to the institutions of an administrative state that generally predated them. As democracy remained contested, and the state continued to restrict civic life, the institutional infrastructure of local governance limited the incorporation of civic, political, and economic associations. In the Civic Localist trajectory, local government institutions developed before much of the administrative state, and under conditions of relatively early democratization and civic mobilisations. This trajectory produced robust local linkages between the state and society, but limited the development of vertical linkages within the state or within civic and political society. The Nationalized trajectory of local state formation and civic organizational development followed elements of both these trajectories. Local government institutions developed as part of a strong administrative state that assigned strong capacities to the local state. Despite late democratization, associational life was encouraged, and the national as well as the local state incorporated unions and business associations from an early phase.
The growth of the policy state proved decisive for the consolidation of local governance infrastructures across the developed world. Growing demands from above for infrastructural power to carry out diverse policies, and the mobilization of local interests and civil society around empowerment of the state to carry out those policies, reinforced the institutional complementarities that the comparative models have highlighted in each type of infrastructure. As the policies the state pursued expanded to encompass promotion of local economic development, provision of welfare services, and protection of the environment, the demands on infrastructural power frequently necessitated a role for local governance. As the policy state elaborated new domains of social, economic, and urban policy and implementation, expanding infrastructures of local governance reinforced systems of linkages between local and national levels of policymaking both within the state and outside of it, as well as at the local level.
The course of institutional development, as well as the horizontal and vertical linkages that helped to drive it, generally followed the logics of infrastructural power and local empowerment in the three models. The Nationalized model was itself predominantly a product of the growth of policy state. In the countries following this model, the local state acquired responsibility for administration of the welfare state along with related powers for planning, development and other policies. The social democratic parties and corporatist organizations active in building the policy state draw strength from incorporation into both the local and the national state. In the Local Elitist countries, the policy state consolidated the power of the national state over local institutions, and a limited role for local civil society. Under Civic Localism, national and intermediate level governments also took on an increasingly dominant role despite the continued strength of civic activity in autonomous spheres of local governance.
Institutional Infrastructures of Local Governance in Contemporary Developing World Democracies: A Comparative Historical Perspective
Comparison with these trajectories of infrastructural development in the developed world illuminates many of the difficulties contemporary developing and transitional countries have encountered in recent efforts to build local governance infrastructures, and the political forces that continue to shape these developments. If we compare cities in contemporary developing countries seeking to carry out physical infrastructure, developmental and social policies with their counterparts a hundred years before in what is now the developed North, the transhistorical juxtaposition highlights both clear differences in the global context of urban governance and several intriguing parallels.
First, the sequences of institutional development for the distinct components of state institutions have differed consistently from those in the first wave democracies that constructed much of their local governance infrastructures earlier. Elements of the policy state at the local level, for instance, in sectors from education to infrastructure policy, have either been limited in scope prior to democracy, or were introduced around the same time as local government systems and democratic institutions. In older democracies, the policy state of the twentieth century was constructed on the basis of established local government institutions that linked local society to the local state and central to local authority, and already included elements of local democracy. As third-wave democracies seek to elaborate policies and administrative practices to implement them at the local level, they must often establish institutions of local government, democratic institutions and administrative authority at the same time.
When urban elites and activists in developing and transitional countries seek to introduce policies that have already been elaborated in the older democracies of the developed world, they also face both the advantages and disadvantages of latecomers. On the one hand, established models of policy and associated institutions are present, including technologies and expertise in such supportive practices as engineering and public administration, and often international expertise in transplanting policy institutions. On the other hand, as Gerschenkron found in his comparison of strategies for industrialization across Europe (Gerschenkron, 1962) , pressures to catch up can dominate the institutionalization of policies to the exclusion of other aims. As the rush to develop infrastructure in China exemplifies, successful deployment of policy models and expertise from the developed world can reinforce authoritarian institutions and regimes. As numerous examples in India and elsewhere attest, the lack of capacity to adapt new policies to existing institutions is an even more pervasive result.
Despite these historically situated differences in context, contemporary institution-building in developing countries also shares some transhistorical resemblances with earlier similar nineteenth-and early twentieth-century processes in the contemporary developed world. As in many first wave democracies of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, movements for national democratization fostered a flowering of growth of civic and political associational activity. As even the already established democracies experienced in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, movements for new policies and reformed administration have followed the movements for democracy itself. The urbanization that historians of nineteenth-century Europe have linked to the rise of civic activity there (Bermeo & Nord, 2000; Morton et al., 2006 ) is now more pervasive in some regions of the developing world, such as Latin America, than it was in Europe at that time.
These contextual conditions help to explain much of the major divergences that persist between urban governance infrastructures of the developed world and those of the Global South.
In developing countries, contemporary infrastructures still provide weaker governmental capacities at the local level. The policy state either emerged under undemocratic regimes with designs that had long marginalized local governments, or remained limited in scope. In contrast with earlier trajectories of contemporary developed countries, in which democratization preceded the development of state infrastructures, many other aspects of the state also remain less developed following democratization.
The relatively weak local states of many developing and transitional countries are consistent with either a Civic Localist or a Local Elitist model. The limited and fragmented professional and economic organization beyond the local state itself might seem to favour the latter categorization. Reports of participation in professional associations and unions, for instance, remain comparatively low across the World Values survey samples of developing countries by comparison with the developed world. The pervasiveness of fragmented informal economies in many cities in developing countries has imposed more difficult conditions for solidary working class organization than in the industrializing cities of Europe in the Fordist era. Along with the growing participation of foreign firms based in developed countries, or production chains linked to them, hierarchically organized domestic companies (Schneider, 2009 ) often offer less of an opening for governance at the urban level itself. Beginning with Almond and Verba's work on the civic culture (Almond, 1989) , much of the literature on civic and political organization in developing and transitional countries with new democracies has assumed that civic and political participation there should also remain weak.
Contemporary cross-sectional comparison, however, reveals rates of civic and political participation in a number of developing countries that exceed those in some developed countries. Democratizing movements in the Third Wave of democratization, like their counterparts that brought the establishment of civic and political organization in the nineteenthand early twentieth-century industrialized countries, have also sought political and civic incorporation at the local as well as national levels of government. As in the earlier history of civic mobilization, civic and political associations have mobilized partly around policy ends, and in particular around deficits in local governance capacities. Advanced urbanization in many developing regions, such as Latin America, has made the concentrated settlement and collective urban challenges that promoted political and social mobilization in industrializing Europe even more widespread.
Cities in a number of countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, already present partial exceptions to the Local Elitist model. Their rates of participation in professional associations and unions, although lower than in the Civic Localist countries, exceed rates in the more developed Local Elitist countries of southern Europe. Professionalization has often had wider ramifications for the construction of authority for governance within cities. In Brazil, professional planners have also helped to drive new initiatives to carry out planning in cities across the country (Holston, 2009) , and professionals in environmental fields have helped spearhead initiatives for governance of resources like river basins (Abers & Keck, 2013) . Union organizations in Brazil played a major role in the emergence of the ruling Workers Party.
Across the developing world, moreover, local governance infrastructures have institutionalized opportunities for participation within cities that often go beyond those available in contemporary Local Elitist or Nationalized infrastructures. Scholars from the North have focused on specific innovative mechanisms of this kind, such as participatory budgeting in a number of Brazilian cities (Abers, 2000; Fung & Wright, 2001 ). However, conventional participatory mechanisms have had more pervasive effects on opportunities to challenge local elites and to mobilize local civic and political constituencies. Elections for local councils and mayors take place more frequently in most Latin American countries than in developed democracies of Europe, and provisions for local referenda and initiatives are also more widespread.
Comparison of this kind makes it easier to understand the emergence of remarkably parallel but unrelated urban protest in disparate developing countries. In such diverse countries as Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey, civic mobilization has risen with demands for democracy, greater administrative capacities and various policies at the local level. Infrastructures of local governance have institutionalized encouragements to participation even as local governance capacities have remained weak. Efforts of the local state to carry out a growing array of local services have faced growing demands from an increasingly mobilized citizenry on the one hand, and lapses in capacities for implementation on the other. In countries like Brazil and South Africa, these developments may presage the emergence of a modified Civic Localist infrastructure of local governance. There and elsewhere, the confrontation of civic and political demands for policy performance at the local level with persistent deficits in local government capacities is likely to make protests like those in the summer of 2013 a regular feature of urban politics.
Conclusion
Transhistorical comparison illuminates the widespread weakness of local government capacity in developing and transitional democracies, and both the commonalities and the wide variations in the strength of local civic and political association there. In the cities of countries like Brazil and South Africa, trajectories toward Civic Localist models of local state-society may be emerging. In other transitional democracies like those of Eastern Europe, the lower levels of civic and political engagement area remain consistent with more Local Elitist models. In no case have the encompassing political and economic organizations and the strong local government capacities of the Nationalized local governance infrastructures in Northern Europe emerged.
These brief reflections point to the need to bring a deeper historical understanding to comparisons of urban governance and politics across the divide between developed country democracies and the new democracies of the developing world. Across the developed and developing worlds, the variations in institutions and state-society relations are as important as any global commonalities. In developing and transitional democracies, efforts at local state building confront conflicts that their counterparts in earlier democratizing countries did not. These conflicts stem partly from trajectories of institutional development that have left local government capacities weak, but also from the demands of urban movements that have helped bring about democratization, and arisen in its wake. The accumulating agendas of the policy state at the local level have imposed greater expectations for local governance that have in turn helped spark civic and political action, including protest. The resulting tensions have helped make local governance infrastructures as central to the politics of contemporary developing countries as they have long been to their counterparts in the developed world.
